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DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS IN RUSSIA
Richard E. Ericson*RUSSIA has been a prime mover in the organization of the BRIC
group of nations. The BRICs, originally a Goldman-Sachs con-
ception, comprise the leading developing economies in their re-
spective regions, with Russia central among the Eurasian emerging
economies. In response to the question, "Can the BRICs be the drivers
of world economic growth?," we briefly explore Russian economic per-
formance and structure, and the prospects for Russia to become a driver
of the world economy in the coming decade.
I. THE RESURRECTION OF RUSSIA
Russia emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union a disorganized
and greatly shrunken economy, struggling through a "transformational
depression" from 1991 through 1998, when Russia defaulted and its
emerging financial markets collapsed. To the surprise of many, the econ-
omy "bottomed out" in the 1998 financial crisis and a strong recovery
began; a recovery that coincided with the first Putin presidency, begin-
ning with appointment by the resigning Boris Yeltsin on December 31,
1999, and then his first round election victory on March 26, 2000. Driven
by a four-fold devaluation of the ruble and subsequent import substitu-
tion opportunities, tight fiscal and monetary policies, and renewed struc-
tural reform, the macro economy grew rapidly during Putin's first
presidential term, overcoming the transitional depression by 2004 (Eric-
son, 2009).
Putin's second term as president, 2005-2008, witnessed new economic
growth and a significant and sustained, if unequally distributed, rise in the
Russian standard of living. This growth of GDP, at a rate of over 7 per-
cent per year in 2003-2008, made Russia the fastest growing as well as the
largest economy in its region, and evidently a driver in regional, and in-
deed world, economic development. The performance indicators,
presented in Table 1, gave credence to the Goldman-Sachs (2003) concep-
*Richard Ericson is a Professor and Chair in the Department of Economics at
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tualization of the BRIC economies as presenting significant investment
opportunities in emerging markets, with Russia as the Eurasian regional
anchor.
Indicator 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
GDP2000 = 100 100.0 126.6 134.7 145.7 158.1 166.3
GDP % A 10.0 7.2 6.4 8.2 8.5 5.2
Industry % A 11.9 8.0 5.1 6.3 6.8 0.6
Investment % A 17.4 13.7 10.9 16.7 22.7 9.9
Unemployment % 10.2 8.3 7.6 6.9 6.1 7.8
Consumption % A 5.9 9.2 11.0 11.0 13.0 8.0
Current Account, $billion 46.8 59.5 84.6 94.7 77.8 103.5
FDI, $billion 4.43 9.4 9.0 29.9 47.1 76.0
Budget Balance % GDP 1.2 4.4 7.5 7.4 4.1 7.0
FOREX +Stab Funds, $billion 32.1 143.4 211.4 392.1 633.2 652.2
Inflation % 20.2 11.7 10.9 9.0 13.3 14.7
Fig. 1: Russian Macroeconomic Performance pre-Crisis (Source: Compiled from
BOFIT Russia Statistics Reports).
Putin and the Russian leadership seized on this concept as a way to
return Russia to a significant position in world affairs. The humiliation of
the 1990s-the loss of economic and military power, the loss of empire,
and the encroachment of NATO in the post-Soviet spaces of Eurasia-
had to be erased in the revival of Russia, and her renewed leading role in
a new world order.' Russia looked to international organizations and al-
liances of convenience with other major and rising powers to restrain the
United States and create a multi-polar world with Russia as a pole. Thus,
Russia actively used the United Nations, OSCE, and other organizations
in which it had a veto or decisive vote to block initiatives it opposed, and
actively pursued the development of international organizations it could
control such as the SCO, the Eurasian Economic Union, and a Gas
OPEC.2 And with its substantial rate of growth, Russia had the eighth
1. This can be seen in numerous speeches by Putin throughout his time in office,
especially in the address to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 10 February
2007, and in his recent election platform statements. See Vladimir Socor, Putin's
Eurasian Manifesto Charts Russia's Return to Great Power Status, EuRASIA DAILY
MONrrOR (Oct. 7, 2011, 5:49 PM), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?nocache=1&
txttnews%5Btt news%5D=38501&tx ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=512.
2. On the Eurasian Economic Community, see Eurasian Economic Community,
EurAsEC Today, EuizAsEC (2011), http://www.evrazes.com/i/other[EurAsEC-to-
day.eng.pdf. On the SCO, see SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORG., http://www.sect-
sco.org/EN/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2012); Representatives from Russia, Qatar, and
Iran, the top three holders of proven NG reserves with 60 percent of the total, met
October 21, 2008, in Tehran to discuss forming a gas exporting cartel. Nothing,
however, has come of this initiative. See Bruce Pannier, Russia, Iran, and Qatar
Consider Gas Troika - Or Gas Cartel, RADIo FREE EUR. RADIO LIBiERTY (Oct.
22, 2008), http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Iran-andQatarConsider Gas_
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largest economy in the world in PPP terms by 2010, and has become the
sixth largest in 2012 with expectation of moving into fifth place in the
next three years.3
Thus, in 2008, Russia had great expectations for a new world order, one
in which it would play a pivotal role. Russia had not only recovered eco-
nomically, but had substantially internationalized her economy, with in-
ternational trade being a major factor in both Russian economic growth
and standards of living. The leading producing sectors of the economy
were substantially integrated into and dependent on world markets, and
consumption, particularly of electronics and automobiles, was heavily de-
pendent on imports. Outside of dying rural regions, the economy was
monetized and marketized, with financial and "real" markets substan-
tially intertwined. And state finances were on a firm basis, with minimal
state foreign debt and substantial state reserves and FOREX holdings.4
While Russian entities owed international creditors some $420 billion,
over 93 percent of that was the private debt of large Russian companies; a
reflection of the "globalization" taking place in the Russian economy.
And both GDP and consumption, the standard of living of the Russian
population, were apparently inexorably growing, and the poverty level
inexorably shrinking, as Putin had promised in 2004 at the beginning of
his second term (Ericson, 2009). This evident success was understood by
the Russian leadership as the consequence of wise monetary and fiscal
policy and the "firm hand of the state" directing economic development
and reallocating its fruits. But as one commentator quipped, the Russian
government confused high oil prices with the genius of their economic
management.
Thus, high growth, high export prices, and substantial reserves spurred
increasingly assertive state policy both domestically and abroad. In 2007-
2008, among the policies pursued was growing state intervention in the
domestic economy, including price controls and openly questioning the
property rights of companies failing to hold down prices and maintain
employment.5 Major business leaders were required to regularly report
to the government (i.e., Putin) on progress toward goals the government
TroikaOrGas Cartel/1332004.html; Iran, Qatar, Russia Form Gas Alliance,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2008, at A13.
3. For Medvedev's final State of the Nation address see Vladimir Rodionov, Outgo-
ing Medvedev Proposes Sweeping Political Reforms, RIA Novosin (Dec. 22, 2011,
3:37 PM), http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111222/170427189.html. For Putin's final Re-
port to the Duma as a Prime Minister see Konstantin von Eggert, Due West: A Few
Surprises in Putin's Final Duma Report, RIA Novos-n (Apr. 12, 2012, 2:15 PM),
http://en.rian.ru/columnists/20120412/172771791.html.
4. Energy export revenues, largely from oil and natural gas, comprised some 25 per-
cent of Russian GDP and over 40 percent of budget revenues in 2008. Woju.no
BANK IN Russ., RUSSIAN EcoNoMic REPORT No. 18 (2009); Womi.o BANK IN
Russ., RUssIAN EcoNoMic REPORT No. 19 (2009).
5. Numerous food price controls were introduced beginning in 2007. In July 2008 a
federal investigation of Evraz Holding and Raspadsty Ugol mining companies for
price fixing was launched, and Mechel steel was publically attacked by Putin for its
price policies. See Stock Markets React to Prime Minister's Statements, BOFIT
WEEKLY (Bank of Fin., Helsinki, Finland), Aug. 1, 2008, at 75.
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had proclaimed, and Putin has reminded business leaders that they
needed to pay back society for their wealth. 6 Major companies, including
Gazprom, Lukoil, Rusal, etc., were encouraged to expand abroad as na-
tional champions, acquiring equity in companies in the same or related
(upstream or downstream) industries. This was accompanied by an in-
creasingly aggressive foreign policy, particularly in Russia's near abroad,
actively intervening in the Ukrainian elections, dictating the terms of
"peacekeeping" in Moldova and The Caucasus, blocking any independent
OSCE initiatives, and rejecting the right of any outsiders to monitor Rus-
sian elections.7 The assertion of Russian preeminence in the region in-
cluded "cyber warfare" in Estonia and Georgia, winter energy cutoffs
(both oil and natural gas to Belarus and natural gas to Ukraine), ostensi-
bly over pricing, and culminated in the long prepared invasion and dis-
memberment of Georgia in August 2008.8 Economic confidence was
evident in increasingly frequent calls for a new world economic order and
replacing the dollar as the international currency, medium of exchange,
and unit of account. Indeed, both Putin and Medvedev, elected president
in May 2008, asserted that the ruble should become an international cur-
rency, equal to the dollar, with Moscow as an international financial
center, and that Russia was ready to become a leader in the new world
order (Ericson, 2009, p. 221). And as a step in that direction, Russia took
the initiative in organizing and convening a BRIC group, beginning with
ministerial discussions after G20 meetings in 2006 and 2008 and culminat-
ing in a BRIC Foreign Ministers Meeting in Yekaterinburg in May 2008,
to provide a common front and supporting actions in the development of
the new world order.9
6. Most recently, see Putin's speech to the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
on 9 February 2012, as reported in Ira loeabashvili & Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen,
Putin Seeks Payments From Those Who Made Fortunes in '90s, WALI ST. J., Feb.
10, 2012, at All.
7. One can see a complete record of this behavior in the Jamestown Foundation's
Eurasia Daily Monitor from 2003 through 2012. Archives, JAMESTOWN FOUND.,
http://www.jamestown.org/archives/monitor/m2002/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
8. Putin recently admitted that the invasion was preplanned and provoked by Russia.
Pavel Felgenhauer, Putin Confirms the Invasion of Georgia Was Preplanned, EUR-
ASIA DAILY MONITOR (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:18 PM), http://www.jamestown.org/pro-
grams/edm/single/?tx-ttnews%5Bttnews%5D=39746&cHash=177fd31 d57370a96
ac7da644dc280014/. On Russian use of cyberwarfare, see Alexander Melikishvili,
The Cyber Dimension of Russia's Attack on Georgia, EURASIA DAILY MONITOR
(Sept. 12, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?nocache=1&txtt
news%5Bttnews%5D=33936.
9. Russia has continued as a prime mover in organizing BRIC summits, first in
Yekaterinburg in 2009, then in Brazil in 2010, China in 2011, and New Delhi in
March 2012. South Africa joined at the 2011 Summit, making the BRIC organiza-
tion 'BRICS.' The fifth summit will be hosted by South Africa. See BRICS Offi-
cial Documents: Summits, BRICS INFO. CENTRE, http://www.brics.utoronto.cal
docs/index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
PROGRESS IN RUSSIA
II. GROWTH FOUNDATIONS
This growth, and the confidence it engendered, was however built on a
rather unstable foundation. While Putin's first term had finished the
transition process from Soviet-type to a market economy, completing
many of the structural reforms started in the 1990s and reestablishing
central authority and state functioning, much institutional and structural
reform remained to be done (Ericson, 2006). Further, much, if not most,
of the economic recovery and new growth was based on favorable world
market conditions and on high and growing prices for that which nature
and Soviet development had bequeathed Russia-energy carriers and
raw materials. Thus, the foundation of this strong performance was re-
source extraction and the export of energy, metals, and grain, generating
a huge financial surplus which the newly effective state was increasingly
able to capture.' 0 The export earnings of these leading, largely extractive
industries multiplied through the economy as they purchased inputs from
domestic manufacturing and service industries, generated new incomes,
and stimulated a rapid rise in consumption and the standard of living.
This demand fueled a rapid rise in imports, as well as domestic consump-
tion. The subsequent expansion of domestic economic activity spurred
borrowing on international markets, particularly as domestic financial
markets remained seriously underdeveloped. While newly created
wealth remained highly concentrated, the Russian state redistributed
much of these rents, primarily to maintain political power and the sup-
port of the elite (Gaddy & Ickes, 2011). Hence, rents were used in sup-
port of existing industrial, and other economic structures, in order to
maintain employment and their continuing operation: a primary compo-
nent of social and political stability.
In this fortuitous international economic environment, in part as a re-
action to the economic and political chaos of the prior decade, it was easy
for the Russian state to reassume a leading role in the economy. Indeed,
some 50 percent of Russian economic activity remained under state con-
trol at the federal, regional, or local level." Putin's Russia opted for
state-directed development in the pursuit of national power and the au-
10. See the World Bank's Russian Economic Report, especially number 1 through
number 6, 2001 through 2003, for the statistical record and budgetary impact. E.g.,
WoRu n BANK IN Russ., RUSSIAN ECONOMic REPOwr No. 1 (2001). The origin
and use of resource rents in the Russian economy are analyzed in Clifford G.
Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, Resource Rents and the Russian Economy, 46 EURASIAN
GEOGRAPHY ECON. 559 (2005).
11. This was asserted by both Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin and Deputy Minister of
Economic Development Andrei Klepach during interviews. Interview with Alexei
Kudrin, Finance Minister, Russia (Oct. 5, 2009); Andrei Klepach, Deputy Minister
of Economic Development, Russia (July 2, 2009). A detailed study by the Siberian
Academy of Innovation concluded that "the share of the state sector in the econ-
omy (is) . . . no less than 50%." A. Neschadin et al., The Public Sector of the
Economy: the Current Russian Case, SmACADLMINNOVA-ION (Oct. 27, 2007),
http://old.sibai.ru/content/view/1185/1330/ (translated by author).
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tonomy of action of a world power.12 Thus, the extractive industries were
natural leaders in the recovery and development processes, but they had
to be kept under tight state supervision, if not direct control, for the state
to properly benefit from their success. The oligarchs were reigned in, and
they and their firms were subject to close political supervision, as were
other major economic operations/firms. All major development projects/
investments required prior (at least tacit) 'authorization' by the leader,
and business leaders undertook regular accountability reporting to him.' 3
Major corporations with foreign operations became "National Champi-
ons," and priority development areas were led by state directed Federal
Corporations and National Projects. Among the National Champions at
the time were Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil, Rusal, Polyus Gold, Alrosa,
and Severstal. And the major Federal Corporations/National Projects
(major funding channels) were Rosatom, VEB, Rostekhnologii, Rusna-
notech, Olimpstroi, and the Housing and Municipal Infrastructure Devel-
opment Fund. In addition, "leading sectors" and elites, however, directly
and deeply integrated into the world economy, often served as (indirect)
agents for the Russian state (e.g., Alfa-group in Central Asian energy de-
velopment, and in Turkish telecoms) (Ericson, 2009). This "development
structure" was controlled by Putin, both directly and through his plenipo-
tentiaries, and through state control and use of the financial commanding
heights, and key state banks: VTB, VEB, Gazprombank, Sberbank, and
Rossel khozbank. 1 4 It was a system of control, far looser than that of the
Soviet command economy that appeared effective in an environment of
effortlessly rising resource incomes and extremely easy international fi-
nancial credit.
This system, however, allowed only limited room for institutional inno-
vation. Maintaining control in such a system requires limiting experimen-
tation with alternate structures or activities. This institutional
conservatism was reinforced by the fear of political and social instability
of the chaos associated with the democracy of the 1990s. Hence, there
was no room for Schumpeterian creative destruction of firms and eco-
nomic activity; only the politically inconvenient could be removed, and
only the familiar and authorized could be initiated. Stability was main-
tained and cooperation was reinforced by the redistribution of resource
rents; directing subsidies, benefits, and privileges toward social and politi-
12. Putin was quite explicit about this strategy of using natural resources for state
power in his doctoral dissertation at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute. See Har-
ley Balzer, The Putin Thesis and Russian Energy Policy, 21 PosT-SOVI ir AiFiF. 210
(2005).
13. This can be seen in the regular meetings reported on the website of the President
of the Russian Federation, particularly during Putin's presidency. See PRESIDENT
oF RussIA, http://eng.kremlin.ru/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
14. State officials were placed on Boards of Directors, usually as Chairman, or in exec-
utive positions, of major business operations. For example Medvedev at Gazprom
prior to running for President, Igor Sechin in Rosneft, Vladislav Surkov in Trans-
nefteprodukt, Sergei Prikhodko in TVEL (nuclear fuel), and Viktor Ivanov in
Aeroflot and Almaz-Antei (air defense).
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cal groups, and traditional economic activities/industries, supporting the
existing structures of economic growth and political power (Gaddy &
Ickes, 2011). Finally, a substantial portion of those rents were seques-
tered in stabilization (Welfare and Development) Funds and State
FOREX Reserves as a buffer against outside shocks, against market and
price volatility.
III. CRISIS AND RECOVERY
Vladimir V. Putin handed over the (formal) presidency to Dmitry A.
Medvedev on May 7, 2008, as the Russian economy began showing signs
of overheating. Inflation was accelerating (to 15 percent year on year in
June), provoking the controls noted above, and both output (10.3 percent
to 3.2 percent) and investment growth (25 percent to 9.9 percent) began
slowing. Financial markets were sharply hit (stocks down over 50 per-
cent; ruble down almost 18 percent) by September, from both war-in-
duced (invasion of Georgia) capital flight and the severe contraction in
world financial markets, both of which led investors to pull out of Russia.
Major Russian firms, heavily indebted to foreign banks, faced loan re-
calls, just as commodity prices collapsed, destroying their ability to re-
pay.'5 After initially denying that Russia could be seriously affected, the
Russian government (Putin, as Prime Minister) reacted strongly and deci-
sively, providing both direct and indirect funding to Russian banks and
firms, using control of the financial "commanding heights," to the tune of
one-seventh of Russian (dollar) GDP-an intervention unmatched in
size, relative to that of the economy in the world. 16 The primary focus of
this support was on preventing equity transfer to foreigners, shutdown of
manufacturing operations, and an increase in unemployment. Thus, sub-
sidies and zero interest loans were provided to pay off foreign debts and
to maintain manufacturing activity, compensating for the collapse in non-
state demand and sales revenues.' 7
Despite this strong policy response, the world financial crisis of 2008/
2009 hit Russia harder than the other BRIC countries, although it only
reached Russia late in 2008.18 Indeed, in the first half of 2008, GDP grew
15. The inability to repay loans led creditors to demand the loan collateral, often eq-
uity in Russian firms, which the Russian state did not want transferred. Hence the
state massively intervened, providing easy credits/grants to pay off loans, forcing
sales of foreign subsidiaries, or blocking equity transfer through Russian court de-
cisions. See Richard E. Ericson, The Russian Economy in 2008: Testing the "Mar-
ket Economy", 25 Posr-Sovnr- AFiF. 223 (2009).
16. For comparison, the immediate U.S. response package of $752 billion, was about 5
percent of U.S. GDP in 2008, and less than half of it was expended by the end of
2008. President Obama's near $800 billion stimulus package raised the total in-
tended U.S. effort to about 10 percent of U.S. GDP.
17. Putin attacked a prominent oligarch, Oleg Deripaska, for failing to maintain oper-
ations in unneeded factories in Pikalevo, and subsidized the automobile maker,
Avtovaz, to maintain employment despite a 90 percent drop in sales. See Ericson,
supra note 16, at 224-25.
18. China, India, and South Africa continued to grow at robust, if slower, rates. Only
Russian and Brazilian GDP fell in 2009, and Brazil's drop was only 0.6 percent.
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by almost 8 percent, investment and consumption by over 13 percent, and
unemployment fell to a new post-Soviet low (5.3 percent). This main-
tained the appearance of continuing economic strength through 2008,
with the full extent of the collapse in growth and economic activity only
evident in the figures for 2009.
Indicator 2000 2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP2000 = 100 100.0 166.3 153.3 159.9 166.8
GDP % Q 10.0 5.2 -7.8 4.3 4.3
Industry % @ 11.9 0.6 -9.3 8.2 4.7
Investment % @ 17.4 9.9 -15.6 6.0 8.3
Unemployment % 10.2 7.8 8.2 7.2 6.1
Consumption % @ 5.9 8.0 -5.0 2.1 6.5
Current Account, $billion 46.8 103.5 48.6 71.1 101.1
FDI, $billion 4.43 76 27.7 13.8 18.4
Budget Balance %GDP 1.2 4.1 -5.9 -4.1 0.8
FOREX +Stab Funds, $billion 32.1 652.2 591.1 593.3 610.6
Inflation % 20.2 13.3 8.8 8.8 6.1
Fig. 2: Russian Macroeconomic Performance post-Crisis (Source: Compiled from
BOFIT Russia Statistics Reports).
Indeed, in the first half of 2009, Russia suffered a much deeper drop
than the table reflects, as second half performance was supported by the
massive subsidies of business that Putin implemented, including the use
of over $250 billion from the stabilization funds. Growth from 2009 was
also supported by a rapid recovery in energy prices,19 cushioning the drop
in stabilization funds and renewing the substantial flow of funds into gov-
ernment coffers. Energy export revenues came to the rescue, supporting
the subsidization policies of the government's crisis rescue operation.
Massive state intervention had pulled the economy out of serious con-
traction by 2011, albeit at a lower growth rate, but with higher incomes
and employment, and lower inflation. But the result remained unsatisfac-
tory; Russia was no longer a world leader in economic growth.
Russian economic policy in the face of the crisis had been sufficient to
block a depression, and restore some growth, but nowhere near the prior
rates that had made Russia a regional development driver. The economic
situation, post crisis, reflected the stability and resilience of the system,
but also showed its apparent inability to generate qualitatively new
Dominic Wilson et al., The BRICs Remain in the Fast Lane, GOLDMAN SACHS 3
(June 24, 2011), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/topics/brics/brics-re-
ports-pdfs/brics-remain-in-the-fast-lane.pdf.
19. From about $40/bbl., Brent oil rose over $80 within a year and was near $120/bbl in




growth. President Dimitry Medvedev, who assumed his position as the
country was overwhelmed by the crisis, began calling for a new growth
model, moving from a resource to technology driven basis, in order to
restore the dynamism of the Russian economy and its position as a poten-
tial engine of world economic development. 20
IV. SEEKING A NEW GROWTH MODEL
In 2009, as the recovery from the crisis was underway, President
Medvedev declared it inadequate. In a series of speeches, he pointed to
the stultifying impact of the current economic system on economic
growth and dynamism. In a major White Paper, presented to the legisla-
ture, "Forward, Russia!," he called for a new innovative, liberal economic
"model," one built around the initiative of the creative classes that would
create qualitatively new growth driven by technological innovation. 2 1 His
administration also commissioned, in 2008, the development of a new
growth strategy, consistent with this vision, to be prepared by the Na-
tional Research University-Higher School of Economics (NRU-HSE). 22
The Russian Presidency (Medvedev) also proposed to the Russian Gov-
ernment (Putin) and the legislature (Duma and Federation Council) a
series of administrative reforms and anti-corruption measures, and
pushed WTO negotiations to a successful conclusion in December 2011.
A major government program to create a "Russian Silicon Valley" in
Skolkovo, outside Moscow, was launched, and a new Direct Investment
Fund with $2 billion state seed money was created to attract $100 billion
in "venture funds" in support of Russian innovative development.23
The logic of the new growth model was laid out in a major set of ana-
lytic reports in late 2011 by scholars largely from NRU-HSE under the
title: Strategy 2020: New Model of Growth.24 This was to be a model of
controlled innovation, innovation that avoided social disruption and up-
heaval, while pursuing the progressive objectives of the Russian State and
20. This was the focus of his second state of the nation address. See Dmitry
Medvedev, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federa-
tion (Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/11/12/
1321 _type70029type82912 222702.shtml.
21. For the fullest statement of his approach, see Dmitry Medvedev, Go Russia! Piwsi
DENT RUSSIA (Sept. 10, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/298.
22. Strategy 2020, INSr. Pun. ADMIN. MUN. MGMTI., http://www.ipamm.hse.ru/eng/au-
thorities/ (official web page for NRU-HSE program and discussion of its origins)
(last visited Jan. 7, 2013). For the final summary report, see STRATEGY 2020,
STRATEGY 2020: Tms11 NEw GROWTH MODELL - A NEW SOCIAL POLIcy, (2012), avail-
able at http://2020strategy.ru/data/2012/03/14/1214585998/1 itog.pdf.
23. Skolkovo was announced on Nov. 12, 2009 by Dmitry Medvedev, to be headed by
Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg and co-chaired by former Intel CEO, Craig
Barrett. It is still developing with little payoff, despite international buy-in. See
Irinia Mokrousovo, Who is earning off "Skolkovo"?, ViOMOSIi (on file with the
author). On the new Direct Investment Fund, see About RDIF, RUSSIAN DIREcr
INVESTMENT FUND, http://rdif.ru/EngIndex/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2013); Gregory
White, Russian Fund Seeks Foreign Investment, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2011, at C3.
24. For access to the documents, see STRA'TGY 2020, http://2020strategy.ru/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 9, 2013).
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Society. Its key recommendations were: (i) emphasis/reliance on human
capital and on innovation by the creative class; (ii) pursuit of institutional
reform, removing barriers to economic growth, and improving the busi-
ness and regulatory climate; and (iii) stimulation of economic competi-
tion through trade liberalization and integration in world manufacturing.
Hence, a critical role is to be played by expanding trade relations, with
particular focus on CIS and the EU.2 5
This pursuit of this new growth model, a more liberal economic system,
appears now to be something of a mirage. Despite new anti-corruption
laws, repeated anti-corruption campaigns, and the constant rhetorical
push during the Medvedev Presidency, the patrimonial system, run by
and for a politically connected elite revolving around Putin, remains fun-
damentally unchanged. 26 Reform measures and laws have been stalled in
endless and repeated "consultations and negotiations" among state and
government bodies-presidential, executive, and legislative-rarely
emerging with any impact. 27 The sole exception appears to be WTO
membership, for which Russia received sufficient concessions to allow
buy-out of the political opposition.28 For all but superficial changes, the
need to maintain social and political stability and order, emphasized by
both Putin and Medvedev, particularly in the wake of the economic crisis,
has triumphed. The system and its leaders are united in blocking socially
disruptive, unauthorized, economic change in pursuing the current lead-
ership's vision of managed "progress" to a technological frontier. Indeed,
even the rhetoric of "Forward, Russia!" and a new growth model has van-
ished with the (evidently long planned) return of Putin to the Presidency,
and the demotion of Medvedev to the role of an implementer of Putin's
initiatives.
25. Strategy 2020 Emphasises Economic Cooperation with CIS Countries and the EU,
BOFIT WEEKLY (Bank of Fin., Helsinki, Finland), Mar. 30, 2012, at 1.
26. For a recent analysis of the imperviousness of corruption to reforms and cam-
paigns in the patrimonial system, see Alena Ledeneva & Stanislav Shekshnia, Cor-
porate Corruption in Russian Regions, 92 Russ. ANALYTicAL DiG. 2, 3-5 (Feb. 22,
2011); Svetlana Tulaeva, How Anti-Corruption Laws Work in Russia, 92 Russ. AN-
ALYTICAL. Dio. 9, 9, 12 (Feb. 22, 2011).
27. This has been particularly true of Medvedev's efforts toward legal reform
"decriminalizing" private economic activity, where the Interior Ministry and
Procuratura have worked to delay and nullify the proposed and decreed legal re-
forms. See William E. Pomeranz, The Magnitsky Case and the Limits of Russian
Legal Reform, 92 Russ. ANALYTICAi DiG. 12, 13 (Feb. 22, 2011); Lilia Biryukova,
President Popravili, Vu coMos-n (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspa-
per/article/255220/prezidenta-popravili (describing how administrative depart-
ments corrected Medvedev's legal reforms).
28. See William Mauldin, Russia to Join WTO, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2011, at A12.
Russian attitudes toward WTO membership have been ambivalent, with serious
opposition from some affected businesses and in the Duma. WTO Ministerial
Conference approved Russian accession in mid-December 2011, but only on Au-
gust 22, 2010, did Russia fully agree to join. Russia One Step Closer to WTO
Membership, BOFIT WEEKLY (Bank of Fin., Helsinki, Finland) Nov. 18, 2011, at
1; Russia's WTO Membership Brings Some Tariff Relief Important for Finland,
BOFIT WEEKLY (Bank of Fin., Helsinki, Finland) Aug. 24, 2012, at 1.
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V. THE FUTURE: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Russia remains the dominant economic power in its region, and a
growing presence in the world economy. But can it be a driver of re-
gional and world economic growth, and a significant part of an interna-
tional investment portfolio, over the next two decades? The answer must
depend not only on the ability of Russia to return to high rates of eco-
nomic growth, but also on its ability to move to the world technological
frontier. Medvedev and his advisors recognized this truth in the call for a
qualitatively new economy, one based on innovation and human initiative
and diversified across a broad range of new technologies and activities.
But that is apt to require changes that the renewed administration of
Vladimir Putin is unlikely to accept.
VI. OBSTACLES TO QUALITATIVELY NEW GROWTH
The primary obstacle to qualitatively new economic growth in Russia is
the nature of the economic system built by Putin since 2005. It is a highly
dirigiste market economy, subject to a patrimonial system of governance.
The patrimonial system, built around personalized authority and reward,
remains strong and thriving. Its beneficiaries, both state and "private,"
have no incentives to give it up, yet are the only ones with the power to
carry out (non-revolutionary) change. They comprise the top political
leadership, the burgeoning bureaucracy, and the owners and managers of
the major firms, particularly in the leading sectors of the economy: natu-
ral resources and energy, banking and finance, transportation, and some
critical manufacturing and strategic industries. 29 Liberalizing and decen-
tralizing institutional reform directly challenges their power, perquisites,
and wealth, and hence such reform flounders in endless bureaucratic dis-
cussion, consultations, and reviews, only making it into a law in a highly
watered down, ineffectual form.
Such has been the fate of reform attacking that essential lubricant of
most Russian economic interaction, corruption. Legal reforms liberaliz-
ing economic law and decriminalizing unauthorized private economic ini-
tiative have similarly died between the Procuracy and Duma, and even
administrative reorganizations, threatening the livelihood of current of-
fice holders, have faded away before passage and implementation. 30 For
example, state corporations are infamous for their wastefulness and non-
29. A list of eleven Strategic Sectors was codified by law on May 5, 2008, restricting
foreign investment in them. See Valery Fadeev, State and Business: Infantilism In-
tellectuals, Vicomos-i (June 7, 2008), available at http://www.vedomosti.ru/news-
paper/article/2008/06/07/150792. The list remains, but amendments to the law
implemented in December 2011 eased some restrictions on foreign investment.
Foreign Strategic Investment Law Continues to Evolve, BOFIT WEEKLY (Bank of
Fin., Helsinki, Finland), Jan. 13, 2012, at 1.
30. Pomeranz, supra note 27; Tulaeva, supra note 26; Medvedev Reiterates Reform
Goals at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, BOFIT WEEKLY (Bank
of Fin., Helsinki, Finland), June 23, 2011, at 1.
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transparency in operation.31 Medvedev announced an effort to eliminate
the state unitary firm as a legal and administrative structure and to re-
form the "federal corporation" (e.g., Rostekhnologii, Rusnanotech) to in-
troduce better control over, and greater efficiency in the use of, state
property.32 To date, these reforms appear to have vanished into bureau-
cratic discussions and interdepartmental consultations. Indeed, the patri-
monial governance structure is essential to the "rent redistribution"
system that maintains social stability and fuels economic activity. Hence,
it is critical to the maintenance of political stability and control. So, as in
Soviet days, we see a "treadmill" of administrative reforms and anti-cor-
ruption drives ultimately doing little to alter the existing system.
Another obstacle arises from the need to mobilize the creative class,
those capable of truly innovating, of creating a new technological basis
for economic expansion, development, and growth. Such creativity, such
innovation, requires substantial individual freedom. In particular, it re-
lies on the freedom to step outside of existing structures and constraints,
to experiment with new, unauthorized, and even hereto unimagined, ac-
tivities, and on the ability to choose one's own leaders and dispose of
one's own resources and incomes without political direction from above.
Such people are naturally politically restive, and their innovative activity
presents an inherent threat to "controllability" of the development pro-
cess, as well as to existing political structures. Further, they pose a "flight
risk" as they are readily employable in the more liberal market econo-
mies of the West. Thus, stimulating qualitatively new economic growth
poses a danger to the foundations of the current political system, the pat-
rimonial structures insuring social stability and the well-being of the cur-
rent elite. And perpetuation of that system blocks true innovation and
qualitatively new growth.
Further, new growth is undercut by the structural legacies of the Soviet
economy, including an aged and obsolete capital stock, a stagnant work-
ing age population lacking appropriate skills for new technologies, an
inefficient organization of production and distribution, and inadequate
31. See Goskorporatsii poimali na narusheniiakh [State Corporations Caught in Viola-
tions], INTERFAX, (Nov. 11, 2009, 12:46 AM), http://www.interfax.ru/business/txt.
asp?id=109384.
32. See Changes Planned for State Companies, BOFIT WEEKLY (Bank of Fin., Hel-
sinki, Finland), Jan. 5, 2012, at 1 (describing criticisms regularly made of state cor-
porations). Medvedev ordered a review of the criticisms in 2009 and raised the
issue of abolishing State Unitary Enterprises. Medvedev Orders Review of State
Corporations, BOFIT WEEKLY (Bank of Fin., Helsinki, Finland), Sept. 18, 2012, at
1. Nothing appears to have come of Medvedev's initiative. The Prime Minister
has ordered the government to prepare suggestions for doing so. See Medvedev
Wants Ideas to Make Cos Get Approval to Buy Assets, PRIME Bus. NEws AGENCY
(Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.lprime.biz/news/ Medvedev wants-ideas-tomake
state cos-get-approval-to-buy-assets/O/%7B19201595-CBTE-42EC-9593-0B33F4
BDEC74%7D.uif; see also Yana Vaziakova et al., Russia: Progress in Structural
Reform and Framework Conditions 15 (OECD Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No.




infrastructure.33 These problems are aggravated by the inappropriate,
and high-cost location of much production/manufacturing activity, a con-
sequence of decades of economically irrational Soviet investment and the
emigration of many of the highest educated skilled employees, a classic
brain drain.
VII. DRIVERS OF CONTINUING GROWTH
Despite the obstacles to implementing a new growth model, there are
factors that will help sustain continuing economic growth and Russian
economic predominance in the region. Resource prices, and in particular
the price of oil, are apt to remain high and rising. Indeed, Russia's rela-
tively rapid recovery from the financial crisis can be largely explained by
the rapid recovery in the price of oil, generating sufficient state income to
support recovery measures and replenish state financial reserves.34 Un-
less there is a collapse of demand in Europe and/or China, energy and
resource prices should continue rising, again generating an investable
state surplus for development, infrastructure projects, and a substantial
planned increase in military and social spending.35 The Russian govern-
ment has also made a priority of restoring Russia's prominence in science
33. See RICIIAi E. EwIcsoN, LEiACIES OF COMMAND: TiH, RUSSIAN ECONOMIC
TIRANsIrIoN Exri Re I.Nce (forthcoming Summer 2013) (discussing Soviet legacies).
The McKinsey Global Institute (1999 & 2009) studies the inefficiencies in ten criti-
cal economic sectors in Russia in 1997 and 2007, shows the impact of structural
legacies in 1997, and both the improvements to 2009 and what needs to be done to
reach western efficiency levels. McKINSEY GLOBAL. INSTr., UNLOCKING ECONOMIC
GRowTi IN RUSSIA, (Oct. 1999); McKINSEY GLOBAL INST., LEAN RUSSIA: Sus-
TAINING ECONOMIC GRow i TiRouGH IMPROViD PRouucivrry, (Apr. 2009).
34. Oil and natural gas export revenues provide over 40 percent to the state budget
revenues. Russ. CEIC Database Team, Russia's Oil and Gas Revenues: Federal
Budget Dilemma, ISI EMiRGING MARKIETIS Bi-oc (May 16, 2011), http://blog.se-
curities.com/2011/05/russias-oil-and-gas-revenues-federal-budget-dilemma/; Rus-
sian Economic Report No. 14, WoRi) BANK Russ. ECON. REv. (World Bank,
Moscow, Russ.), June 2007, at 9; Russian Economic Report No. 24, WoRLD BANK
Russ. ECON. REV. (World Bank, Moscow, Russ.), Mar. 2011, at 18; Russian Eco-
nomic Report No. 26, WoRDI) BANK Russ. ECON. REV. (World Bank, Moscow,
Russ.), Sept. 2011, at 20-25; Russian Economic Report No. 27, WoRI I BANK Russ.
ECON. Rv. (World Bank, Moscow, Russ.), Apr. 2012, at 10-11, 26-28.
35. Stephen Blank, Lurching Toward Militarization: Russian Defense Spending in the
Coming Decade, EuRASIA DAILY MONITOR (Jan. 5, 2011, 4:13 PM), http://www.
jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?txttnews%5Bttnews%5D=37318&tx
ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=5c3c1d0a84; Pavel Felgenhauer, Voters Will
Pay for a Military Buildup After Electing Putin, EuRAsIA DAILY MONITOR (Nov.
17, 2011, 4:08 PM), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?nocache=1&tx ttnews%5
Btt news%5 D=38683&tx ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=f0ab715b475f2730
6279c57bec9c012e. The military build-up is a recently emphasized Putin-
Medvedev priority. Spending on the power agencies is planned to rise from 24
percent to 30 percent, driven by defense spending rising from 15 percent to 20
percent. Social spending is to rise to 29 percent of the state budget. See Current
Budget Framework Calls for Sharp Hikes in Spending on Defence and National
Security, BOFIT WEEKLY (Bank of Fin., Helsinki, Finland) Oct. 14, 2011, at 1.
The Finance Minister, Alexei Kudrin, lost his position in September 2011 after
criticizing the planned 2.1 trillion ruble ($66 billion) increase in defense spending.
See Tai Adelaja, A Laundry List for the Kremlin: Russia's Former Finance Minister
Alexei Kudrin Has Come up With a Plan to Help the Kremlin Maintain Fiscal Dis-
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and technology, earmarking substantial budgetary resources to both fun-
damental and applied sciences and to R&D, reversing a two decade con-
traction, that will become available with continuing strength of resource
and energy prices. Thus, rising energy prices should also help counter the
brain drain of the past decades. Finally, increased business and state rev-
enues from strong export prices will stimulate rising consumer demand
and the development of both consumer and business services.
Another factor that should support continuing solid economic growth
is Russia's recent accession to WTO, negotiated and signed in December
2011 and ratified by the Duma August 22, 2012. The agreement opens
eleven service sectors to foreign participation, introduces international
technical and phytosanitary standards, requires a 50 percent cut in agri-
cultural subsidies, and general tariff reductions spread across eight years,
one-third immediately, one-third in three years, and the rest in eight
years. 36 This is apt to drive some further internal liberalizations and re-
forms and open more foreign markets to Russian goods, while increasing
production efficiency by subjecting Russian manufacturers to (slowly, by
design) increasing competition. 37 It will also help foster greater openness
to foreign investment and technological sharing, enhancing moderniza-
tion of industry. And this boost to growth is apt to be reinforced by the
announced renewed privatization drive, aiming to reduce the state share
in many industries without sacrificing state control.38
Growth in the near term will also be driven by the continuing restruc-
turing of inherited industrial capacities, investment in modernization, and
in new technologies and equipment. Transportation and energy infra-
structures are also the subject of state development plans, where massive
investments are required, and in social service infrastructure, including
housing. This "development" investment can be expected to provide a
stimulus for increased industrial production and investment. There are
also a number of major state investment projects that will stimulate eco-
nomic activity, including the 2014 Olympics and 2018 World Cup facili-
cipline, RUSSIA PROFILE (Oct. 19, 2011), http://russiaprofile.org/business/47417.
html.
36. WTO Accession Means Many Changes, Moscow TIMis (Nov. 10, 2011), available
at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/paid/2001/11/10.html.
37. For a summary of the World Bank's detailed analysis of the impact of WTO acces-
sion on Russia, indicating its strongly positive potential, see Russian Economic Re-
port No. 27, supra note 34. As noted above, this is a major part of Strategy 2020.
38. Further privatization is emphasized in all government discussions of reform, al-
though its contours and specific content continue shifting and remain unclear. See
Sale of State-Owned Enterprises Moving into New Phase, BOFIT WIEKLY (Bank
of Fin., Helsinki, Finland) July 1, 2011, at 1; Cabinet Approves Latest Programme
to Privatise State-Owned Enterprises; Exact Schedule and Scope Remain Unclear,
BOFIT WEEKLY (Bank of Fin., Helsinki, Finland) June 15, 2012, at 1; Maxim
Tovkailo, The Government is Preparing to Extend the Privitization Program,
VioMos-n (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2011/08/03/
1332680; Ira losebashvili, Russian Privatization Plan Raises Questions, WALL STr.
J., June 21, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230373420457746
8513760329818.html.
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ties, and off-shore Siberian and Arctic energy field development, with its
supporting oil/gas export infrastructure.
VIII. CAN RUSSIA HELP CARRY WORLD GROWTH TO A
HIGHER LEVEL?
For the structural reasons discussed above, it is doubtful that Russia
will have the impact on world economic development of the other BRIC,
especially China. Russia, however, is and will remain the dominant econ-
omy in Central Eurasia and an engine of growth for the former FSU
countries of that region. Its forecast growth to 2015, largely driven by oil
prices, is unimpressive but stable; most analyses see growth in the 3.5-4.2
percent range per year.39 But that is clearly inadequate for Russia's am-
bitions and will be only mediocre in international comparisons, particu-
larly with the other BRIC.
The government sponsored Russia-2020 program demands at least 5
percent per year to meet social needs, and provides three potential scena-
rios for Russian economic development. 40 The first is what is called the
Inertia scenario, without significant change in the structuring or function-
ing of the current system. It promises annual growth stagnation at 3-3.5
percent to 2020. The second is an Energy Resource Based scenario,
where Russia focuses on fully exploiting its comparative advantage in en-
ergy resource development and export. In this scenario, annual growth
steadies at 4-5 percent, but around 2020 begins tapering off. Finally, an
Innovation Based scenario, built on economic liberalization and mobiliza-
tion of the "creative class," is outlined. Here, annual growth rises to over
6 percent, 2015-2020, and the foundation is built for high growth beyond
that. Unfortunately, none of these scenarios begins to grapple with the
patrimonial system that is the true obstacle to rapid economic growth,
despite much talk of reforms to improve the business climate. 41
Again for the reasons adduced above, the innovation based, and even
the resource based scenarios are much less likely than inertia, barring a
major political change in Russia. Russia will provide a steady source of
growing demand on the world market, but not enough to call forth new
growth in the way Chinese demand has and will.
Russia's primary impact on world economic growth is far more likely to
lie on the supply side. Russia will support world, especially Asian, eco-
39. At the end of 2011, all forecasts were lower: Russian domestic: 3.1-3.7 percent per
year; BOFIT: 3.5 percent per year; WB-Russia: 3.3-4.0 percent per year. Following
4.3 percent GDP growth in 2011, WB-Russia increased its forecast growth rate to
this range, with high oil prices driving growth at the upper end.
40. See the preliminary report from August 2011 and the final report of January 2012
on the website: http://2020strategy.ru/. For an early analysis of the state assign-
ment see ANDREW C. KUCIl[NS, Amy BEAVIN & ANNA BRYNDZA, RUSSIA's 2020
STRATEGIC ECONOMic GOALS AND me1E RoLEv OF INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION
(2008).
41. The ambivalence about systemic reform was evident at the 2012 Davos Conference
in St. Petersburg. See Schumpeter, Davos on the River Neva, EcoNoMIsT, June 30,
2012, at 70.
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nomic growth by providing energy supplies and raw materials, while
maintaining a steady demand for finished products from other countries.
And its biggest impact will undoubtedly be regional. Russia is a primary
purchaser of raw materials and semi-fabricates from the FSU states of
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and is a primary supplier of energy and
finished products. And Russia is apt to maintain that position for the
next decade, despite the efforts of some of these countries to diversify
their international economic interactions. This role will be enhanced by
closer integration of the Eurasian Common Market, and customs union,
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) where Russia shares
leadership with China, now her primary competitor in Central Asia.42
Finally, we might expect greater Russian integration into, and impact
on, northeast Asian development through both energy supply (new oil
and gas pipelines and LNG supply) and attracting development invest-
ment and skilled labor into its underdeveloped far eastern and east Sibe-
rian regions. While both political (Kuril/Northern Territory dispute) and
psychological (Russian xenophobia) barriers remain, we might expect the
natural economic benefits of such integration, the development of natural
resources, and the opening of foreign markets, to overcome these barriers
in the coming decade. But it is rather unlikely that Russia will become
more than a regional economic engine in the coming decade, despite per-
haps having the fifth largest (PPP) GDP in the world on the strength of
its resource and energy export earnings.
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